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Abstract	
At	its	inception	Left	Realism	argued	the	need	to	develop	a	radical	social	democratic	approach	
to	crime.	I	argue	that	its	contribution	and	continuing	relevance	primarily	lies	in	this	political	
project,	 the	need	for	which	has	not	dissipated.	But	this	can	only	be	advanced	as	an	integral	
component	of	a	more	general	renewal	of	social	democratic	ideas	and	politics	that	challenges	
the	hegemony	of	neo‐liberalism.	This	is	far	from	guaranteed.	The	possibilities	and	challenges	
after	the	global	financial	crisis	are	considered.	I	argue	for	a	rethinking	of	some	core	themes	
from	 early	 Left	 Realism	 to	 (as	 I	 see	 it)	 better	 complement	 the	 task	 of	 social	 democratic	
renewal	in	the	present.		
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Introduction	
The	 Left	 realist	 project	 in	 criminology	 was	 initiated	 in	 the	 1980s	 with	 the	 central	 aim	 of	
developing	 a	 social	 democratic	 approach	 to	 crime	 (see	 Taylor	 1981	 for	 an	 early	 Left	 realist	
argument	 although	 he	 did	 not	 invoke	 the	 label;	 Currie	 1985;	Hogg	 1988;	 Jones,	Maclean	 and	
Young	1986;	Kinsey,	Lea	and	Young	1986;	Lea	and	Young	1984;	Lowman	and	MacLean	1992;	
Matthews	and	Young	1986).	Its	heyday	was	the	decade	from	the	early	1980s	to	the	early	1990s.	
Work	in	the	field	continued,	although	more	sporadically	and	with	more	of	a	focus	on	theory	or	
specific	 issues	 and	 less	 on	 the	 original	 idea	 of	 developing	 a	 wide‐ranging,	 social	 democratic	
crime	 agenda	 (DeKeseredy	 and	 Schwartz	 2010,	 2012;	 Lea	 2002;	 Walklate	 2015).	 The	
publication	 of	 Roger	 Matthews’	 Realist	 Criminology	 (2014)	 provides	 a	 welcome	 occasion	 for	
reflection	and	debate	on	the	contemporary	relevance	and	role	of	Left	Realism.		
	
I	argue	that	the	principal	contribution	of	Left	Realism	was	and	remains	political	in	nature.	Left	
realists	made	the	case	for	a	distinctive	social	democratic	politics	of	crime.	It	reflected	the	sense	
that	 crime	 had	 become	 newly	 politicised,	 a	 vital	 electoral	 battleground	 and	 an	 important	
ingredient	in	hegemonic	political	strategy.	Nothing	has	changed	in	this	regard,	but	adopting	this	
perspective	suggests	–	as	 I	will	argue	 in	 the	 first	half	of	 the	paper	–	 that	 the	past	history	and	
present	 role	 of	 the	 Left	 realist	 project	must	 be	 considered	 in	 the	 context	 of	 shifts	 across	 the	
broader	 political	 landscape	 over	 the	 last	 30	 years,	 the	 rise	 of	 neo‐liberalism,	 the	 impact	 of	
populism	 (in	 penal	 politics	 and	politics	 at	 large),	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 Left	 and	 the	prospects	 of	
social	democratic	renewal	in	the	wake	of	the	global	financial	crisis	(GFC)	and	the	contemporary	
outpouring	of	popular	protest	around	the	world.	I	take	the	view	that	Left	Realism	must	work	in	
concert	with	the	wider	politics	of	social	democratic	renewal.	 In	 the	second	half	of	 the	paper	 I	
revisit	some	of	the	key	themes	in	the	original	Left	realist	project	and	consider	how	they	might	
be	recast	in	the	light	of	present	conditions.		
	
Hope	 and	 fear:	 The	 paradox	 of	 neo‐liberalism	 and	 the	 failures	 of	 social	 democratic	
politics		
In	the	years	immediately	following	Margaret	Thatcher’s	victory	in	the	1979	general	election	in	
Britain	 (and	 Ronald	 Reagan’s	 in	 the	 US	 presidential	 election	 in	 1980),	 the	 Left	 across	 the	
Anglophone	world	continued	to	display	a	general	optimism	about	the	political	future.	The	birth	
of	Left	Realism	reflected	this	optimism	and	shared	in	it.	It	was	not	dimmed	(and	may	even	have	
been	buoyed)	by	an	awareness	of	the	radicalism	of	the	New	Right.	Many	foresaw	resistance	that	
might	open	the	way	to	a	radical	Left	alternative.	It	was	not	to	be.	The	hegemonic	political	project	
of	the	Right	prevailed,	eclipsing	the	post‐war	social	democratic	consensus	and	the	pivotal	roles	
of	the	welfare	state	and	Keynesian	economic	management.	Neo‐liberalism	became	entrenched	
as	 the	 new	 political	 orthodoxy	 in	 many	 parts	 of	 the	 world.	 The	 public	 issues	 that	 animated	
politics	 in	the	1960s	and	1970s	–	poverty,	 inequality,	re‐distribution,	social	rights,	combatting	
corporate	power	–	were	buried	behind	the	promise	of	personal	 freedom,	enlarged	choice	and	
widespread	 prosperity,	 courtesy	 of	 ‘the	 market’.	 Criminologists	 with	 progressive	 political	
leanings	continued	to	engage	with	the	theoretical,	research	and	policy	issues	of	the	day,	but	Left	
Realism	not	surprisingly	lost	some	of	its	political	bearings.	Its	prospects	of	revival	as	a	political	
project	 are	 entwined	 with	 the	 more	 general	 revival	 of	 social	 democratic	 politics	 –	 a	 wider	
ranging	 renewal	 of	 progressive	 political	 ideas,	 energy,	 organisation,	 strategy	 and	 confidence.	
This	is	far	from	guaranteed.	
	
Under	the	reign	of	neo‐liberalism	many	have	prospered	economically	but,	for	many	others,	the	
era	 is	 one	 of	 ‘vertiginous’	 anxieties	 (Young	 2007)	 and	 a	 growing	 precariousness	 in	 personal,	
family,	work	and	community	life.	Pervasive	anxiety	has	been	a	major	source	of	the	conservative	
appeal	to	harsh	policies	on	crime,	welfare,	immigration	and	other	social	issues.	The	Right	took	
the	advantage	on	two	fronts:	the	pursuit	of	free	market	policies	that	overwhelmingly	favoured	
the	wealthy	few	over	the	poor	and	middle	classes	and	the	promise	to	contain	and	repress	the	
social	fall‐out	from	these	same	policies.	
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The	social	democratic	Left	has	singularly	failed	to	lay	bare	the	responsibility	of	the	Right	for	the	
insecurities	 and	 instability	 the	 latter	 so	 deftly	 exploits.	 If	 street	 crime	 in	 the	 70s	 could	 be	
successfully	 pinned	 by	 the	 Right	 on	 the	 supposed	 moral	 flabbiness	 and	 permissive	 social	
policies	 associated	 with	 the	 welfare	 state,	 then	 the	 great	 waves	 of	 financial	 crime	 and	 near	
collapse	of	the	global	economy	in	the	GFC	should,	one	would	think,	have	been	able	to	be	sheeted	
home	 to	 the	 greed,	 licence	 and	 amoral	 personal	 and	 corporate	 behaviour	 unleashed	 by	 the	
Right’s	deregulatory	policies	and	free	market	ideology.	It	was	Thatcher	and	Reagan	that	lit	the	
fuse	 that	 blew	 up	 the	 global	 economy	 in	 2008,	with	 dire	 social	 consequences	 for	millions	 of	
people	who	lost	their	homes,	their	jobs	and	their	savings.	Pervasive	criminality	in	the	financial	
sector	was	an	undeniable	fact	contributing	to	the	crisis.	Yet	not	only	were	there	no	significant	
criminal	prosecutions,	neo‐liberal	dominance	has	remained	 largely	unshaken	 in	 the	aftermath	
(Ferguson	2012;	Hogg	2013b).	 The	many	 lessons	of	 the	GFC	 are	 yet	 to	be	 fully	digested.	 The	
most	 important	 might	 be	 that	 this	 was	 not	 just	 an	 economic	 crisis	 but,	 as	 David	 Marquand	
(2015:	2)	has	suggested,	‘also	a	crisis	of	the	moral	economy	[emphasis	added]’.		
	
Parties	of	the	Left	and	centre	Left	are	inhibited	from	effectively	making	this	argument	because	
they	accepted	Thatcher’s	argument	that	there	was	no	alternative	to	her	neo‐liberal	agenda.	This	
also	 reduced	 them	 to	 practising	 a	mostly	managerial	 or	 technocratic	 politics	 from	which	 the	
confident,	 inspiring	 vision	 of	 a	 more	 equal,	 socially	 just	 world	 largely	 disappeared.	 Social	
democratic	politics	has	thus	struggled	for	purpose	and	relevance.		
	
Much	the	same	story	can	be	told	with	respect	specifically	to	law	and	order.	Centre	Left	leaders	
like	Bill	Clinton,	Tony	Blair	and	many	(state)	Labor	Party	leaders	in	Australia	were	convinced	of	
the	need	to	take	 law	and	order	seriously	(just	as	the	Left	realists	had	counselled),	but	 in	their	
haste	 to	 avoid	 being	 outflanked	 on	 the	 Right,	 they	 simply	 borrowed	 right‐wing	 rhetoric	 and	
policies,	sometimes	even	amplifying	them	to	boost	their	bona	fides	(on	Clinton	see	Walker	1997:	
318,	324‐326;	on	Blair	see	Blair	2010:	55‐57).		
	
The	current	political	malaise		
The	upshot	is	that	the	Right	still	owns	the	terms	of	the	political	conversation	even	as,	issue	by	
issue,	 many	 of	 their	 policies	 remain	 unpopular	 and	 are	 a	 source	 of	 widespread	 disaffection.	
Governments	of	both	the	Right	and	the	Centre	Left	have	often	imposed	policies	(on,	for	example,	
privatisation,	 corporatisation	 of	 education	 and	 health	 services,	 and	 stripping	 support	 for	 the	
poor)	 that	 are	 not	 popular,	 but	 political	 convergence	 has	 left	 voters	 with	 little	 real	 choice.	
Nonetheless,	 strong	 public	 feeling	 still	 imposed	 limits	 on	 neo‐liberal	 ambitions.	 Many	 of	 the	
social	democratic	reforms	of	the	60s	and	70s	–	those	of	Labor/Labour	governments	in	Australia	
and	 Britain	 and	 Johnson’s	 ‘Great	 Society’	 programmes	 –	 survived	 the	 neo‐liberal	 assault:	
environmental	 regulation,	 consumer	 protection	 laws,	 work	 and	 product	 safety	 laws,	 anti‐
discrimination	laws,	and	the	repeal	of	overtly	racist	immigration	laws,	to	name	a	few.	They	are	
now	too	entrenched	 to	be	wound	back	or	even	 to	be	 recognised	and	celebrated	as	significant	
social	democratic	reforms.		
	
The	neo‐liberal	marketisation	of	so	many	other	areas	of	everyday	 life,	 including	politics	 itself,	
and	 the	 corruption,	 insecurities	 and	 cynicism	 it	 has	 brought	 in	 its	 wake	 has	 fed	 a	 growing	
disaffection	with	conventional	politics	and	declining	trust	 in	public	 institutions	(Coggan	2013;	
Hay	 2007;	 Marquand	 2015).	 This	 is	 where	 neo‐liberalism	 in	 economic	 and	 social	 policy	
connects	to	the	growing	political	salience	of	law	and	order,	for	the	crisis	of	trust	and	confidence	
fuels	the	turn	to	punitive	rhetoric	and	policies	as	a	key	political	tactic	to	engage	the	disaffected,	
tap	 public	 anxieties	 and	 shore	 up	 flagging	 legitimacy.	 Political	 disenchantment	 has	 also	
increased	the	attraction	of	third	parties	and	independents,	and	deepened	involvement	in	social	
movement	 politics	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 traditional	 mass	 party	 politics	 (feminism,	
environmentalism,	 identity	 politics,	 on‐line	 activism,	 and	 so	 on).	 These	movements	 can	 claim	
huge	successes	on	many	issues,	but	the	‘big’	questions	of	social	inequality,	wealth	redistribution	
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and	tackling	power	and	privilege	cannot	be	addressed	without	an	over‐arching	social	vision	and	
hegemonic	political	strategy.		
	
Large‐scale,	enduring	political	reform	requires	broad	social	coalitions	and	a	shared	vision	of	a	
just	 social	 order.	 It	 also	 depends	 on	 deepening	 democratic	 institutions	 and	 practices	 both	 to	
advance	 a	 progressive	 hegemonic	 politics	 and	 to	 defend	 gains	 against	 inevitable	 backlash.	
Unfortunately,	 the	major	democratic	 advances	made	 across	 large	parts	 of	 the	 globe	 since	 the	
1990s	 (in	 Latin	 America,	 Eastern	 Europe,	 South	 Africa	 and	 some	 parts	 of	 South	 East	 Asia)	
appear	 to	be	giving	way	 to	a	 growing	 ‘crisis	of	democracy’	 that	 is	affecting	both	new	and	old	
democratic	 states	 (Coggan	 2013).	 Democratic	 disaffection	 can	 tempt	 people	 to	 reach	 for	 or	
accept	(often	incrementally)	authoritarian	solutions,	a	wide	variety	of	which	is	also	on	offer	in	
today’s	world	(Kampfner	2010).		
	
The	challenge	of	populism	
The	rise	of	populism	is	a	further	symptom	of	the	current	democratic	malaise.	Left	Realism	in	the	
1980s	was	a	political	response	to	the	role	of	crime	in	an	emerging	‘authoritarian	populism’	(Hall	
et	al.	1978),	but	it	was	eclipsed	by	the	populism	it	sought	to	challenge	(Pratt	2006).	Right	wing	
populist	parties	and	movements	have	recently	grown	 in	size	and	 influence	 in	 the	US	(the	Tea	
Party),	UK	(UKIP),	Australia	(a	variety	have	come	and	gone	since	One	Nation)	and	across	large	
parts	of	Europe,	often	with	street	crime	as	one	symbolic	focus	 linked	to	other	core	obsessions	
with	 immigration,	 xenophobia	 and	 welfare.	 Left	 wing	 populist	 movements	 and	 parties	 (like	
Occupy,	 the	Arab	Spring,	Syriza	 in	Greece	and	 the	 Indignados	and	Podemos	 in	Spain)	are	also	
proliferating	 as	 part	 of	 a	 more	 general	 upsurge	 in	 popular	 protest	 across	 the	 globe	 (The	
Economist	Intelligence	Unit	2013;	Mason	2013).	The	drivers	of	protest	movements	are	diffuse,	
overlapping	and	constantly	shifting	and	evolving:	economic	distress,	inequality,	unemployment,	
political	repression,	government	austerity,	deficient	public	services,	environmental	degradation,	
public	safety,	corruption,	cronyism	and	corporate	abuses.	In	several	cases	(the	uprisings	of	the	
Arab	 Spring	 in	 Tunisia	 and	 Egypt;	 protests	 in	 Brazil	 and	 Turkey)	 a	 local	 incident	 or	
demonstration	was	the	trigger	that	set	off	a	larger,	prolonged	protest	movement	directed	at	the	
heart	of	political	power.	Popular	disaffection	is	in	many	places	widespread	and	deeply	felt	and	
there	is	a	roiling	volatility	just	below	the	surface	of	daily	life.		
	
Although	 there	 is	 diversity	 there	 are	 also	 some	 common	 features.	 There	 is	 firstly	 the	 deeply	
ingrained	distrust	of	the	political	and	corporate	establishment.	Secondly,	there	is	the	return	to	
political	and	popular	visibility	of	questions	of	inequality	and	fairness	that	are	registered	in	other	
developments	 such	 as	 the	 unlikely	 popularity	 of	 French	 economist	 Thomas	 Picketty’s	 (2014)	
socialist	tome,	Capital	in	the	Twenty‐First	Century.	Thirdly,	there	is	a	self‐conscious	refusal	and	
rejection	of	 conventional	 forms	of	 political	 organisation	 and	expression	 (parties,	manifestoes,	
political	 programmes,	 ideology).	 The	 movements	 often	 lack	 any	 clearly	 defined	 political	
purpose,	ideology	or	strategy,	being	more	in	the	nature	of	collective	expressions	of	indignation	
and	 angry	 disavowal	 at	 the	 conduct	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 elites	 and	 the	 performance	 of	
established	institutions.		
	
‘Populist’	is	freely	used	by	commentators	as	a	pejorative	that	captures	what	they	regard	as	the	
emotional,	 non‐rational,	 politically	 directionless	 (or	 simply	 anti‐political)	 and	 aberrant	
character	of	 this	new	politics.	 (Criminologists	have	done	much	the	same	thing	 in	 their	critical	
accounts	of	penal	populism:	Hogg	2013a).	This	cries	out	for	reassessment,	especially	in	light	of	
the	 alienating	 effects	 of	 the	 managerialism	 that	 dogs	 contemporary	 mainstream	 politics.	 A	
growing	 literature,	 from	 diverse	 disciplines	 and	 standpoints,	 has	 sought	 to	 balance	 the	
traditional	rationalist	bias	of	political	theory	and	discourse	with	a	proper	recognition	of	the	role	
of	 emotions	 in	 politics	 (Haidt	 2013;	 Laclau	 2007;	 Moisi	 2009).	 Caricatures	 of	 populism	 are	
challenged.	Far	from	being	a	perversion	of	healthy	democratic	politics,	 it	 is	a	dimension	of	the	
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normal	democratic	practice	of	politics	and	needs	to	be	taken	much	more	seriously	at	large	and	
in	penal	politics	more	specifically	(Hogg	2013a;	Quilter	2014).		
	
Reviving	social	democracy		
The	resurgence	of	global	protest	and	return	of	 inequality	as	a	political	issue	suggest	the	times	
may	favour	a	rethinking	and	reinvention	of	Left	social	democratic	politics.	Thinkers	from	across	
a	broad	Left	spectrum	have	 laid	down	markers	 for	such	a	 revivalist	project	 (Hall,	Massey	and	
Rustin	2013;	Judt	2010;	Marquand	2015).	But	there	are	major	challenges	in	the	way	of	such	a	
task.	Foremost	is	the	challenge	of	connecting	politically	(which	is	to	also	say	emotionally)	with	a	
wide	constituency,	or	variety	of	constituencies.	How	can	the	Left	once	again	 inspire	hope	and	
confidence,	what	were	once	its	hallmarks?	If	it	is	to	do	so,	if	a	renewal	of	social	democracy	is	at	
all	possible,	it	will	have	to	take	populism	much	more	seriously	(Laclau	2007).		
	
Populist	 politics	 is	 accused	 of	 offering	 simplistic	 solutions	 to	 complex	 problems.	 However,	 it	
also	increases	access	to	politics	for	those	who	feel	themselves	excluded	or	alienated	from	power	
and	 the	 political	 process.	 At	 its	 core	 it	 contests	 the	 increasingly	 dominant	 idea	 of	 politics	 as	
mere	 administration,	 a	 disenchanted	 realm	 in	 which	 problems	 are	 managed	 and	 interests	
coordinated	 according	 to	 technical	 criteria	 and	 pragmatic	 calculation.	 It	 challenges	 what	
Margaret	Canovan	describes	as	politics	stripped	of	 its	secular	 ‘redemptive’	 face	and	the	moral	
and	 emotional	 appeal	 of	 the	 democratic	 ‘promise	 of	 a	 better	 world	 through	 action	 by	 the	
sovereign	people’	(Canovan	1999:	11).	It	engages	people	outside	the	political	class	and	the	older	
institutionalised	 channels	 of	 communication	 and	 influence.	 It	 cuts	 through	 the	 increasingly	
predictable,	scripted	and	alienating	verbiage	and	rituals	of	contemporary	managerial	politics.	If	
it	 is	 guilty	 of	 offering	 simple	 solutions,	 of	 promising	 more	 than	 it	 can	 deliver	 and	 raising	
expectations	that	are	bound	to	fall	short	of	realisation,	this	merely	confirms	that	populism	is	a	
(usually	 unacknowledged)	 dimension	 of	 democratic	 politics	 in	 general.	 It	 certainly	 does	 not	
justify	 the	 condescending	 dismissals	 so	 familiar	 amongst	 the	 commentariat.	 The	 populist	
promise	that	political	power	might	be	made	transparent	to	the	popular	will:	
	
...	 is	 not	 entirely	 illusory:	 it	 really	 is	 the	 case	 that	 people	 who	 can	 manage	 to	
believe	 in	 the	possibility	of	 collective	action	and	to	unite	behind	 it	can	exercise	
more	 power	 than	 if	 they	 give	 up	 and	 concentrate	 on	 their	 private	 affairs	 …	
Unrealistic	 visions	may	 be	 a	 condition	 of	 real	 achievements	 as	well	 as	 being	 a	
recipe	for	disappointment.	(Canovan	1999:	13)		
	
The	lessons	 for	social	democratic	politics	are	many.	The	importance	of	a	presence	in	daily	 life	
and	popular	culture	(including	of	course	social	media	nowadays)	is	underscored.	So	too	is	the	
importance	of	 reviving	 the	 idea	 that	politics	 is	educative	 rather	 than	merely	 reactive	 to	polls,	
focus	 groups	 and	 rancorous	 media	 campaigns.	 Reviving	 radical	 social	 democracy	 presents	
major	political,	cultural	and	social	challenges.	It	may	not	even	prove	possible	in	today’s	world,	
but	 if	 such	 a	 rethinking	 and	 reimagining	 is	 not	 attempted,	 Left	 politics	 seems	 destined	 to	
continue	down	its	current	path	of	progressive	ossification	and	irrelevance.		
	
Left	Realism	and	social	democratic	renewal		
I	 have	 laboured	 the	 general	 argument	 concerning	 the	 larger	 question	 of	 social	 democratic	
political	renewal	for	a	reason.	If	Left	Realism	is	conceived	as	a	political	project	that	aims	to	exert	
an	enduring	influence	on	the	direction	of	policy	and	change,	this	only	makes	sense	if	 it	woven	
into	a	viable	social	democratic	politics	and	narrative	(Brown	2011).	A	Left	realist	criminology	
offering	 itself	 primarily	 as	 a	 theoretical	 critique	 of	 other	 criminologies	 –	 ‘liberal’,	
‘administrative’,	 ‘Left	 idealist’,	 and	 so	 on	 –	 may	 contribute	 something	 to	 critical	 intellectual	
debates	in	criminology	(see	Matthews	2014),	but	it	also	risks	contributing	to	less	healthy	trends	
towards	 fragmentation	 (Bosworth	 and	 Hoyle	 2011)	 and	 evangelism	 (Brown	 2002;	 Carlen	
2011).	This	works	against	 the	sort	of	non‐sectarian	collaboration	and	dialogue	within	broadly	
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progressive	research,	policy	and	practitioner	communities	that	may	best	serve	Left	Realism	as	a	
political	 project.	 Left	 Realism,	 like	 social	 democratic	 renewal	 at	 large,	 should	 eschew	
sectarianism	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 broad‐based,	 open,	 ecumenical	 ethos,	 a	 political	 composite	 that	
draws	(as	contemporary	progressive	political	essayists	like	Marquand	in	Britain	and	Dionne	in	
America	argue)	on	‘the	most	resonant	traditions	within	our	political	culture’	(Marquand	2015:	
17;	Dionne	2012).	It	needs	to	be	concerned	with	the	nitty‐gritty	of	policy	and	with	evidence,	but	
also	 with	 political	 values	 and	 popular	 narratives	 in	 which	 law	 and	 order	 concerns	 are	
articulated	with	a	larger	social	democratic	political	vision	and	project.	Fundamentally,	it	has	to	
challenge	head‐on	the	assumptions	of	neo‐liberalism	in	economics,	politics	and	popular	culture.		
	
It	 is	 here	 that,	 in	 rethinking	 Left	 Realism	 for	 the	 twenty‐first	 century,	 useful	 bearings	 can	 be	
taken	from	that	seminal	contribution	to	critical	criminology,	Policing	the	Crisis	(Hall	et	al.	1978).	
Written	before	the	election	of	Margaret	Thatcher	and	the	rise	to	dominance	of	neo‐liberalism,	
its	account	of	the	growing	political	salience	of	crime	and	of	the	‘drift’	toward	a	 ‘law	and	order	
society’	was	 deeply	 prescient	 (also	 see	 Hall	 1979).	 It	 showed	 that	 far	 from	 being	 a	marginal	
political	 issue,	crime	and	 law	and	order	concerns	were	central	 to	 the	public	experience	of	 the	
British	crisis	in	the	1970s	and	to	the	efforts	of	the	political	Right	to	fashion	a	hegemonic	strategy	
that	 would	 secure	 popular	 consent	 for	 its	 ‘solutions’,	 blending	 neo‐liberalism	 and	
authoritarianism,	a	 ‘free	economy’	enforced	by	a	 ‘strong	state’	(Gamble	1988).	Essential	to	the	
Right’s	success	(and	to	Hall	et	al.’s	1978	analysis,	one	heavily	influenced	by	the	Italian	Marxist,	
Antonio	 Gramsci	 (1971))	 was	 the	 struggle	 at	 the	 level	 of	 everyday	 experience	 and	 common	
sense.	Crime	–	and	certain	crimes	in	particular	(like	‘mugging’)	–	symbolised,	or	were	made	to	
symbolise,	so	much	more	than	mere	violations	of	the	law:	the	impact	of	non‐white	immigration	
on	 the	 transformation	 of	 urban	 neighbourhoods;	 threats	 to	 national	 identity;	 declining	
economic	fortunes;	and	the	failings	of	the	welfare	state.	Crisis	was	thereby	experienced	as,	and	
in	 some	 degree	 reduced	 to,	 a	 crisis	 of	 social	 order	 whose	 solution	 would	 be	 found	 in	 the	
recourse	to	tough	law	and	order	measures.	Some	key	Left	realist	themes	might	be	reconsidered	
in	this	light.		
	
Taking	crime	seriously:	Local/global		
The	foremost	task	Left	Realism	set	itself	was	to	get	the	Left	to	take	crime	seriously,	to	abandon	
the	habit	of	downplaying	 its	gravity,	dismissing	evidence	of	popular	 fears	as	exaggerated	and	
disproportionate,	 as	 mere	 moral	 panic	 instigated	 by	 the	 media	 or	 cynical	 political	 forces.	 A	
social	democratic	approach	to	crime,	they	argued,	must	take	seriously	the	concerns	of	ordinary	
citizens,	 especially	 those	without	power	and	 influence	or	 the	means	 to	 look	after	 themselves.	
This	was	underscored	by	the	fact	that	everyday	personal	and	household	crime	(assaults,	theft,	
and	so	on)	was	heavily	 concentrated	 in	poor	and	socially	marginal	 communities.	The	unequal	
distribution	of	crime	compounded	all	the	other	forms	of	distress	battled	by	those	at	the	bottom	
of	 the	 social	 heap	 in	 an	 unequal	 society.	 Crime	most	 gravely	 affected	 those	 who	 could	 least	
afford	to	protect	themselves	or	withstand	its	impacts.	Moreover,	tough	political	rhetoric	on	law	
and	order	designed	to	assuage	middle‐class	fears	did	not	translate	into	effective	local	responses	
to	 crime	 for	 those	 most	 affected.	 One	 problem	 was	 that	 the	 unequal	 impacts	 of	 crime	 were	
masked	 in	 official	 statistics	 and	 victim	 surveys	 that	 presented	 a	 general,	 usually	 national,	
picture	 of	 crime	 and	 crime	 trends.	 A	 scaling	 down	 of	 methods	 was	 needed	 to	 capture	 the	
realities	of	crime	at	a	local	level	in	the	most	affected	communities.	This	was	linked	to	demands	
for	 greater	 responsiveness	 and	 accountability	 of	 police	 and	 other	 institutions	 responsible	 for	
managing	local	crime.	
	
Patterns	of	 inequality,	concentration	and	compounding	have,	 if	 anything,	 increased	 in	 the	 last	
30	years	 in	many	places.	The	 increasing	commercialisation	of	security	has	allowed	those	who	
can	afford	it	to	further	insulate	themselves	from	the	effects	of	crime	by	purchasing	ever	greater	
and	more	technologically	sophisticated	forms	of	security.	This	protection	does	not	stop	at	crime	
but	 often	 involves	 erecting	 borders	 against	 conditions	 and	 categories	 of	 people	 regarded	 as	
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troubling	or	suspect	in	some	way	–	rowdy	youth,	minorities,	the	poor	–	with	attitudes	towards	
such	 groups	 increasingly	 framed	 by	 discourses	 of	 crime	 and	 disreputability.	 A	 growing	
emphasis	on	crime	prevention	and	managing	risk	has	thus	fed	into	more	generalised	modes	of	
social	exclusion	based	on	categorical	suspicion.	Those	who	cannot	afford	to	purchase	entry	to	
the	secured,	increasingly	privatised	spaces	of	modern	life	are	left	to	fend	for	themselves	in	the	
badlands	 beyond,	 where	 they	 are	 exposed	 to	 ever	 greater	 crime	 risks	 and	 cycles	 of	
victimised/victimising	behaviour	(Davis	1990;	Genn	1988).	
	
The	 need	 to	 address	 the	 deeply	 unequal	 distribution	 and	 impacts	 of	 crime	 at	 the	 local	 level	
remains	undiminished.	But	the	earlier	focus	of	the	realists	on	responsive	and	accountable	local	
policing	 needs	 to	 be	 pushed	 further	 to	 embrace	 other	 criminal	 justice	 institutions	 (notably	
courts	and	corrections)	and	other	domains	of	public	policy.	Justice	reinvestment	is	one	strategy	
that	 has	 this	 potential:	 to	 simultaneously	 make	 the	 link	 and	 redress	 the	 imbalance	 between	
shrinking	 local	 social	provision	 in	 the	neediest	 communities	 and	 the	churning	of	people	 from	
these	 communities	 through	 an	 expanding	 criminal	 justice	 system	 and	 back	 to	 the	 same	
communities,	 usually	 with	 the	 net	 effect	 that	 local	 social,	 economic	 and	 crime	 problems	 are	
exacerbated	 rather	 than	 ameliorated	 (Allen	 and	 Stern	 2007;	 Bales	 and	 Nagin	 2011;	 Brown,	
Schwartz	and	Boseley	2012).	Justice	reinvestment	(like	most	reform	ideas)	can	be	steered	in	a	
variety	 of	 directions.	 The	 struggle	 to	 frame	 it	within	 a	 social	 democratic	 politics	 is	 therefore	
imperative	 (Brown	 2011).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 can	 appeal	 to	 others	 –	 fiscal	
conservatives	and	liberals	–	should	be	seen	as	a	political	advantage.		
	
The	example	of	justice	reinvestment	illustrates	a	larger	point:	that	it	is	also	important	to	scale	
up	the	analysis	from	the	local	to	regional,	national	and	global	levels.	Crime	increasingly	ramifies	
across	borders.	This	 is	obviously	true	of	organised	crime,	 terrorism	and	other	crimes	that	are	
transnational	 in	nature,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 true	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 some	crimes	 (the	phenomenon	of	
‘mugging’	in	the	1970s	or	even	a	single	local	crime	like	the	1992	abduction	and	murder	of	two‐
year	 old	 Merseysider	 James	 Bulger)	 resonate	 well	 beyond	 any	 particular	 locality,	 inflecting	
public	 fears	 and	 conditioning	 political	 responses.	 More	 fundamentally,	 the	 forces	 that	 shape	
local	crime	problems	are	never	just	local	in	provenance.	Consider	impacts	of	deindustrialisation,	
collapsing	 local	 employment,	 the	 hollowing	 out	 of	 inner	 cities,	 and	 systematic	 home	
foreclosures	that	socially	eviscerated	whole	streets	and	neighbourhoods	in	many	US	cities	in	the	
GFC:	 it	 is	necessary	 to	make	 the	 connection	between	 larger	 structural	 forces	 driving	 growing	
social	inequality	and	polarisation	and	local	crime	and	safety	problems.	Complementary	policies	
are	required	to	tackle	both.		
	
A	particular	challenge	confronts	social	democratic	politics	in	the	global	era,	both	generally	and	
in	 relation	 to	 crime.	 Although	 there	 is	 nothing	 new	 about	 geo‐political	 divides	 and	 gross	
inequalities	 between	 societies	 of	 the	 global	 North	 and	 global	 South,	 new	 media	 and	
communications	 technologies	 and	 cross‐border	 travel	 and	 mobility	 permits	 as	 it	 motivates	
increasing	numbers	of	people	to	both	think	and	act	globally.	Inequalities	are	driving	behaviour	
in	 novel	ways.	 A	 sense	 of	 relative	 deprivation	 and	 feelings	 of	 humiliation,	 injustice	 or	 indeed	
hope	 for	a	better	 future	 translate	 into	asylum	seekers	 fleeing	armed	conflict	and	persecution,	
economic	 migrants,	 terrorists,	 people	 traffickers,	 drug	 cartels,	 and	 many	 others,	 acting	 to	 a	
degree	 and	 in	 ways	 unknown	 before.	 Poor	 and	 rich	 worlds,	 zones	 of	 chaos	 and	 zones	 of	
prosperity,	are	linked	in	manifold	new	ways.		
	
Crime	 is	 consequently	 also	politicised	 in	 novel	ways.	 It	 is,	 for	 example,	 increasingly	 linked	 to	
questions	of	national	security.	Fear	of	crime	in	local	communities	is,	then,	not	just	a	function	of	
local	crime	but	is	conditioned	by	faraway	events	and	global	anxieties.	Local	and	global	are	newly	
intertwined.	 It	 is	necessary,	 therefore,	 to	set	 the	unequal	and	concentrated	effects	of	 crime	at	
the	local	level	and	within	nations	in	the	context	of	the	gross	inequalities	in	crime	and	violence	
between	 nations	 and	 regions	 (Currie	 2009)	 and	 recognise	 the	 growing	 interconnections	
between	the	two.	US	demand	for	illicit	drugs	and	supply	of	guns	fuels	organised	violence	(and	
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corruption)	on	a	massive	scale	in	parts	of	Latin	America	where	drug	cartels,	private	militias	and	
police	and	armed	forces	are	locked	in	conflict.	This	is	in	turn	linked	to	extreme	levels	of	violence	
played	 out	 on	 the	 streets	 of	 some	 of	 America’s	 inner	 cities,	 where	 armed	 gangs	 confront	
increasingly	 militarised	 police.	 It	 is	 not	 enough,	 therefore,	 to	 focus	 on	 local	 crime	 problems	
without	also	addressing	the	structural	conditions,	illegal	markets	and	chains	of	activity	in	which	
they	are	embedded.		
	
A	common	response	to	the	insecurities	(job	losses,	novel	criminal	and	other	threats)	produced	
by	 globalisation	 in	 the	 rich	world	 is	 defensive	 in	 character.	 People	 are	 increasingly	 drawn	 to	
xenophobic	parties	and	movements	that	promise	to	slash	foreign	aid	and	shut	national	borders	
to	 immigrants,	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 other	 unwanted	 intrusions	 from	 the	 outside	 world.	 The	
social	 democratic	 Left	 is	 confronted	 with	 the	 very	 difficult	 issue	 of	 how	 to	 reconcile	 the	
traditional	commitment	to	the	idea	that	the	first	responsibility	of	a	nation	state	is	the	security	
(economic	and	social	as	well	as	physical)	of	its	own	citizens	with	the	imperative	of	addressing	
global	problems	of	inequality,	poverty	and	environmental	crisis,	a	dilemma	made	all	the	harder	
by	the	fact	that	its	own	constituencies	are	the	most	vulnerable	to	the	adverse	effects	of	change	
and	thus	to	the	appeal	of	right‐wing	populists.		
	
There	is	no	simple	way	through	this	issue.	Crimes	like	terrorism,	Internet	pornography	and	on‐
line	fraud,	and	problems	like	people	movements,	climate	change	and	financial	interdependence	
are	 unavoidably	 global	 in	 nature.	 It	 is	 illusory	 to	 believe	 that	 nations	 can	 any	 longer	 shield	
themselves	from	the	troubles	of	the	outside	world	(or	that	there	is	any	longer	a	simple	‘inside’	
and	‘outside’,	that	the	local	is	not	also	global).		
	
Taking	the	penumbra	of	crime	seriously:	Incivilities	and	anti‐social	behaviour		
In	stressing	the	importance	of	an	effective	response	to	street	crime	left	realists	were	careful	to	
distinguish	 their	position	 from	the	 ‘broken	windows’	approach	of	US	Right	realists.	The	 latter	
promoted	a	‘zero	tolerance’	approach	not	only	against	street	crime	but	also	minor	disorders	and	
incivilities.	 Their	 argument	 was	 that,	 left	 unchecked,	 such	 disorder	 fuelled	 public	 fears	 and	
community	 deterioration,	 which	 ultimately	 led	 to	 more	 serious	 crime	 (Wilson	 and	 Kelling	
1982).	Left	realist	criticisms	reflected	their	genuine	concern	for	the	civil	liberties	implications	of	
such	an	approach	as	well	as	their	sense	that	it	would	compound	local	alienation	from	the	police,	
inhibit	 cooperation	 and	 reduce	 effectiveness	 in	 addressing	 ‘real’	 crime	problems	 (Kinsey,	 Lea	
and	Young	1986;	 also	see	Matthews	1992).	The	British	Labour	Government	under	Tony	Blair	
was	(once	again)	more	influenced	by	the	Right	realists,	launching	a	controversial	legal	crusade	
against	 anti‐social	 behaviour.	 The	 critical	 responses	 to	 this	 and	 other	 such	 measures	 where	
legally	 prohibited	 conduct	 is	 ill‐defined	 and	 police	 enjoy	 enormous	 discretion	 raises	 real	
concerns,	but	it	may	be	time	to	reconsider	the	efficacy	of	a	reflex	legalist,	civil	liberties	posture	
on	these	issues.		
	
The	 realities	 are	 that	 street	 disorder	 has	 always	 been,	 and	 remains,	 a	 central	 concern	 of	 the	
police	and	when	considered	in	context	(rather	than	in	terms	of	abstract	legal	categories)	crime	
and	disorder	are	not	always	so	easily	disentangled.	As	well,	in	other	contexts	(like	racial	abuse	
and	 vilification	 or	 sexual	 harassment)	 the	 Left	 generally	 supports	 more	 not	 less	 efforts	 at	
controlling	borderline	illegal	behaviours	that	offend	and	humiliate	and	which	they	often	see	as	
belonging	 on	 a	 continuum	 with,	 or	 symptomatic	 of,	 much	 more	 serious	 problems	 of	
victimisation	 and	 discrimination.	 The	 crucial	 issue	 is	 not	whether,	 but	 how,	 various	 forms	 of	
anti‐social	behaviour	should	be	policed.	The	problem,	at	 least	 in	 the	Australian	context	 (and	 I	
suspect	 elsewhere),	 is	 that	 policing	 public	 order	 has	 so	 often	 involved	 excessive	 and	
discriminatory	 responses,	 like	 arresting	 individuals	 for	 pissing	 in	 laneways	 or	 swearing	 at	
police,	with	 the	disproportionate	burden	 falling	on	young	people,	 the	poor,	 the	homeless	 and	
minorities.	 (In	 the	 Australian	 context,	 Indigenous	 people	 are	 massively	 disproportionately	
affected	by	such	laws.)		
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Whilst	recognising	these	problems	it	is	possible	to	affirm	the	importance	of	civility	in	everyday	
life,	seek	to	recast	meanings	and	priorities	 in	sanctioning	 it	and	expose	the	grosser,	genuinely	
threatening	(and	often	racialised	and	gendered)	forms	of	incivility	that	are	currently	unpoliced	
or	under‐policed.	There	have	been	some	recent	examples	in	Australia	of	private	citizens	using	
their	cell	phones	to	capture	the	racial	intimidation	of	travellers	or	workers	on	public	transport	
and	passing	them	on	to	police	or	mainstream	media	outlets.	Irrespective	of	whether	or	not	such	
citizen	‘policing’	should	lead	to	prosecutions	or	formal	intervention	of	some	kind,	it	might	feed	
into	a	progressive	redrawing	of	the	normative	contours	of	discussion	and	sanctioning	practices	
around	anti‐social	behaviour.	Realists	should	also	highlight	the	utter	hypocrisy	of	those	on	the	
Right	 who	 attack	 racial	 vilification	 laws	 as	 violations	 of	 free	 speech	 whilst	 showing	 utter	
indifference	 to	 the	vast	numbers	of	poor,	young	and	minority	 individuals	who	are	tossed	 into	
police	cells	on	a	daily	basis	for	much	more	trivial	violations	of	offensive	language	and	behaviour	
laws.		
	
There	is	another	level	on	which	this	debate	should	also	be	engaged.	In	other	circumstances,	like	
for	example	tax	avoidance	by	corporations	or	the	rich,	the	legalist	argument	of	strict	compliance	
is	habitually	trotted	out	as	a	sufficient	answer	to	every	claim	of	improper	conduct.	Sticklers	for	
the	rule	of	law	when	it	comes	to	their	own	conduct	insist	that	it	is	enough	that	there	has	been	no	
clearly	 established	 violation	 of	 the	 law.	 Questions	 of	 fairness	 and	 equity	 and	 (dis)respect	 for	
widely	 shared	moral	 and	 social	norms	are	 simply	not	permitted	 to	arise	 in	 these	discussions.	
This	 is	 another	 discursive	 battleground	 on	 which	 Left	 realists	 might	 mount	 campaigns:	 to	
endeavour	 to	 invest	concepts	 like	anti‐social	behaviour	with	new	and	different	meanings	 that	
capture	what	is	often	the	genuinely	(and	seriously)	anti‐social	character	of	behaviour	engaged	
in	by	the	big	end	of	town,	 including	tax	avoidance,	polluting	 local	environments,	and	business	
practices	that	variously	involve	fraud,	deception,	intimidation,	harassment,	cheating	workers	of	
their	entitlements,	and	so	on	(Croall	2009).	As	Croall	points	out,	many	of	these	activities	have	
deeply	corrosive	impacts	on	community	safety,	public	trust	and	the	fabric	of	civic	life,	but	they	
are	missing	entirely	from	debates	around	anti‐social	behaviour	and	the	apparatus	of	knowledge	
and	control	directed	at	managing	it.		
	
The	struggle	here	is	to	link	such	practices	to	larger	political	questions	of	fairness	and	justice	and	
to	 lower	 the	 threshold	 for	 judging	 them	 in	 moral	 and	 social	 terms	 rather	 than	 solely	 by	
reference	 to	 formal	 legal	 criteria:	 in	 short,	 to	 define	 the	 deviancy	 of	 the	 powerful	 up.	 It	 is	
possible.	 In	 Britain	 in	 2012,	 a	 social	 media	 campaign,	 carrying	 the	 tacit	 threat	 of	 boycotts,	
embarrassed	Starbucks	into	voluntarily	paying	additional	tax	to	the	Inland	Revenue	(Ferguson	
2012).	The	difficulty	lies	in	moving	beyond	one‐off	campaigns	such	as	this	to	generalise	moral	
awareness	 and	 engender	 a	 more	 permanent	 shift	 in	 the	 common	 sense	 framing	 and	 public	
control	 and	 accountability	 of	 corporate	 (mis)conduct.	 The	 challenge	 is	 to	 forge	 a	 new	moral	
economy	 that	 supports	 a	 re‐ordering	of	 state	 and	society	and	a	 re‐thinking	of	what,	who	and	
how	we	criminalise	and	dispense	justice	(Marquand	2015;	Thompson	1993).		
	
Re‐thinking	realist	critiques	of	administrative	criminology	
Left	realists	have	been	harsh	critics	of	‘administrative	criminology’	(see	Matthews	2014:	12‐15).	
These	 critiques	 go	 together	 with	 others	 directed	 at	 the	 growing	 role	 of	 risk,	 actuarialism,	
prevention	 and	 security	 in	 criminological	 discourse	 and	 policy	 agendas.	 All	 could	 be	 seen	 as	
symptoms	 of	 an	 increasingly	 dominant	 managerialist	 politics,	 which	 has	 also	 infected	 social	
democracy.	 While	 it	 is	 important	 to	 avoid	 fetishising	 numbers	 (Young	 2011:	 44),	 it	 is	 also	
necessary	 to	recognise	 the	essential	 role	numbers	play	 in	political	and	criminological	debates	
and	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 modern	 government	 (Rose	 1991).	 Statistics	 and	 other	 forms	 of	
quantification	 are	 political	 artefacts,	 but	 they	 are	 no	 less	 significant	 or	 necessary	 for	 that.	 In	
some	 areas,	 the	 problem	 is	 a	 critical	 shortage	 of	 the	 forms	 of	 numericisation	 that	 play	 an	
important	role	in	problematising	particular	issues.	For	many	years,	the	governments	in	the	US‐
led	Coalition	 that	 invaded	Afghanistan	and	 Iraq	after	9/11	engaged	 in	a	 calculated	process	of	
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denial	 in	 relation	 to	 civilian	 casualties	 by	 simply	 choosing	 not	 to	 know	 (‘We	 don’t	 do	 body	
counts’	 said	 US	 General	 Tommy	 Franks,	 a	 line	 echoed	 by	 government	 officials	 in	 Britain	 and	
Australia).	 The	 task	 was	 left	 to	 NGOs	 (like	 Iraq	 Body	 Count	 in	 the	 UK:	
https://www.iraqbodycount.org/)	to	collect	and	disseminate	information	on	war	casualties	and	
lift	the	fog	of	political	denial.		
	
Recent	 police	 killings	 of	 Afro‐American	men	 in	 the	 US,	 beginning	with	 the	 shooting	 death	 of	
Michael	Brown,	a	young	Black	man,	in	Ferguson,	Missouri	in	August	2014	have	led	to	riots	and	
prompted	widespread	public	 soul‐searching.	Those	seeking	statistics	on	 the	 incidence	of	such	
killings	 each	year	 in	 the	US	quickly	discovered	 that	no	 accurate	 count	was	 available.	 The	FBI	
keeps	some	figures	but	local	police	forces	are	not	mandated	to	provide	the	data.	It	is	impossible,	
therefore,	 to	readily	assemble	a	national	picture,	a	reliable	knowledge	of	how	many	there	are,	
which	police	forces	are	involved,	the	race	and	other	characteristics	of	victims,	and	trends	over	
time.	 Police	 killings	 are	 a	 symptom	 of	 problems	 that	 run	 deeper	 and	 a	 potential	 trigger	 to	
inquiry	and	reform.	The	Department	of	 Justice	 investigation	prompted	by	Brown’s	killing	and	
the	subsequent	riots	confirmed	the	existence	of	a	general	pattern	of	oppressive,	discriminatory	
treatment	 of	 the	 poor	 and	 minorities	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 local	 criminal	 justice	 system	 in	
Ferguson,	and	by	implication	in	other	inner	city	areas	of	America	with	large	Black	populations	
and	 grave	 levels	 of	 poverty.	 Numbers	 can	 be	 a	 vital	 tool	 in	 making	 the	 hidden	 visible,	 in	
commanding	public	attention	and	in	building	political	pressure	for	change.		
	
In	 2014	 US	 Democratic	 congressman	 John	 Conyers	 introduced	 a	 corporate	 crime	 bill,	 the	
Corporate	Crime	Database	Act,	which	would,	if	enacted,	require	the	US	Department	of	Justice	to	
establish	a	central,	publicly	accessible	database	recording	all	criminal,	civil	and	administrative	
proceedings	 against	 corporations	 in	 the	 US.	 A	 small	 step	 if	 it	 were	 to	 succeed,	 but	 a	 not	
insignificant	 one,	 given	 the	 substantial	 silence	 on	 corporate	 crime	 in	 public	 and	 political	
discourse.	Crime	statistics	are	socially	produced	but	this	does	not	detract	 from	their	powerful	
role	in	the	construction	of	crime	as	a	social	problem,	in	delineating	its	meanings	and	conferring	
a	certain	coherent	shape	on	disparate	phenomena,	making	it	possible	for	journalists,	politicians	
and	criminologists	to	talk	in	common	sense	terms	about	the	crime	problem,	to	map	its	locations,	
produce	tables	and	graphs	of	crime	trends	and	convey	implicit	ideas	about	the	social	profiles	of	
offenders.	 Public	 discourse	 is	 organised	 and	 coheres	 around	 these	 common	 sense	
understandings	and	concerns.		
	
There	 is	 something	 that	 might	 be	 usefully	 called	 a	 ‘crime	 complex’,	 an	 apparatus	 of	
power/knowledge	 in	 Foucault’s	 sense.	 It	 comprises	 the	 core	 enforcement	 and	 knowledge‐
producing	 agencies	 (police,	 courts,	 corrections);	 government	 statistical	 and	 research	 bureaux	
that	 collate	 and	 publish	 crime	 data,	 undertake	 victim	 surveys	 and	 other	 policy‐relevant	
research;	opinion‐shaping	 institutions	and	practices	 (like	media,	polling	organisations,	 and	 so	
on);	and	a	growing	array	of	commercial	industries	with	interests	in	managing	crime	problems	
(insurance,	 private	 security).	 Administrative	 criminology	 and	 the	 many	 tools	 of	 crime	
measurement	 and	 visualisation	 are	 integral	 parts	 of	 the	 ‘crime	 complex’.	 The	 complex	 is	 not	
monolithic	 in	 nature.	 Agencies	 and	 actors	 within	 it	 do	 not	 consciously	 collude	 to	 produce	 a	
uniform	picture.	Rather,	relationships	are	symbiotic.	Institutionalised	interdependencies	tend	to	
ensure,	 for	 example,	 that	 statistics	 of	 recorded	 crime	 (such	 as	 the	 FBI	 Index)	 are	 widely	
reported	by	media,	consumed	by	the	public	and	utilised	by	government.	They	make	it	possible	
to	 speak	credibly	 about	 the	general	 state	of	 crime,	whether	 it	 is	 increasing	or	not,	 and	which	
types	of	crime	in	particular	are	contributing	to	these	trends.	 It	 is	a	sort	of	moral	barometer	of	
the	 state	 of	 the	 nation	 that	 shapes	 public	 attitudes	 and	 guides	 policy.	 Such	 is	 the	 ritualistic	
character	of	such	processes	that	few	are	led	to	ask	how	such	forms	of	knowledge	are	constituted	
and	 what	 they	 include	 and	 exclude.	 The	 effect	 is	 to	 reproduce	 a	 dominant,	 common	 sense	
knowledge	and	understanding	of	the	crime	problem	which	circulates	in	self‐perpetuating,	self‐
reinforcing	 fashion	within	 the	 crime	 complex	 itself	 and	 the	wider	 society	 and	 in	 turn	 shapes	
other	opinion‐forming	processes	(like	questions	in	polls	and	focus	groups	that	predetermine	the	
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crime	 problem	 about	 which	members	 of	 the	 public	 are	 prompted	 to	 express	 their	 fears	 and	
concerns).		
	
The	 striking	 feature	 of	 the	 crime	 complex	 is	 that	 so	 much	 crime,	 and	 certainly	 most	 of	 the	
crimes	and	harms	perpetrated	by	the	powerful	(corporations	and	the	wealthy),	is	systematically	
excluded	 from	it.	Although	not	necessarily	exempt	 from	regulation	 in	some	 form	(usually	of	a	
sparing,	non‐stigmatising	nature),	anyone	wishing	to	produce	a	coherent	picture	(of	incidence,	
trends,	 and	 so	 on)	 would	 need	 to	 trawl	 through	 the	 annual	 reports	 and	 other	 archives	 of	
multiple	bureaucracies	with	widely	varying	regulatory	responsibilities,	operating	philosophies	
and	rules	for	counting	and	reporting	illegal	behaviour.	Substantial	labour	would	be	required	to	
even	begin	to	construct	what	would	still	be	at	best	a	radically	incomplete,	patchwork	knowledge	
of	the	universe	of	white	collar	and	corporate	criminal	activity	and	the	modes	of	justice	to	which	
it	is	subject.	Such	a	diffuse	institutional	pattern	and	opaque	body	of	knowledge	is	antithetical	to	
simple	 representation	 according	 to	 the	 ‘rules’	 and	 routines	 governing	 the	 organisation	 of	 the	
public	discourse	on	crime	in	the	crime	complex.	Great	swathes	of	serious	criminal	wrongdoing	
consequently	elude	popular	everyday	representation	and	understandings	of	the	crime	problem.		
	
Despite	Edwin	Sutherland’s	(1949)	efforts	to	expose	the	criminological	blindness	to	white	collar	
crime	and	the	long	and	fruitful	tradition	of	research	and	theory	he	initiated,	the	crime	complex	
remains	almost	completely	impervious	to	it.	White	collar	and	corporate	crime	may	be	a	thriving	
research	area	but	as	a	special	 topic	or	sectional	 interest	only	 that	 largely	remains	outside	 the	
criminological	mainstream	and	its	routine	habits	of	thought,	characteristic	ways	of	talking	and	
institutionalised	knowledge‐producing	processes.		
	
Conyers’	bill	was	a	modest	attempt	to	make	a	small	dent	in	this	power/knowledge	edifice.	Left	
realist	energies	might	be	better	expended	on	supporting	and	further	developing	such	initiatives	
–	 initiatives	 that	 aim	 to	 reconstruct	 the	 crime	 complex	 along	 progressive	 lines	 –	 than	 on	
rehearsing	critiques	of	‘administrative’	criminology,	which	is	a	soft	theoretical	target	but	a	much	
harder	political	nut	to	crack.	This	is	a	struggle	over	common	sense	attitudes	and	beliefs	and	the	
often	mundane	bureaucratic	practices	and	processes	that	shape	and	maintain	them.	It	is	of	more	
than	 trivial	 political	 significance	 because	 common	 sense	 concerning	 crime	 and	 control	 is	
insinuated	 in	 the	 circuits	 of	 ideological	 and	 cultural	 power	 through	which	 social	 relations	 of	
dominance	and	subordination	are	maintained	and	the	structures	of	authority	supporting	them	
legitimised.	It	is,	in	other	words,	an	important	element	in	hegemonic	power	relations.		
	
Conclusion:	Searching	for	a	good	social	democratic	law	and	order	story		
I	am	mindful	that	most	of	what	I	have	argued	relates	to	challenges	for	the	future	although	I	hope	
some	practical	pathways	for	developing	a	fresh	social	democratic	approach	to	crime	have	been	
suggested.	 But	 is	 it	mostly	 just	wishful	 thinking?	 In	 these	 times	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 share	 Gramsci’s	
‘pessimism	of	 the	 intellect’	and	not	so	easy	 to	summon	his	 ‘optimism	of	 the	will’.	Yet	political	
renewal	does	depend	upon	just	such	a	recovery	of	hope,	confidence	and	vision.	Some	heart	at	
least	 should	 be	 taken	 from	work	 on	 comparative	 political	 economy	 and	 penal	 policy	 (Lacey	
2008;	Pratt	et	al.	2005)	which	reveals	that	not	all	countries	and	regions	have	been	on	the	same	
political	(and	punitive)	trajectory.	In	particular,	it	tells	a	quite	hopeful,	‘big	picture’	story	about	
crime,	 justice	 and	 social	 democracy	 in	 the	 Nordic	 world	 (Sweden,	 Denmark,	 Norway	 and	
Finland).		
	
The	Nordic	experience	shows	that	 taxing	heavily	 to	 invest	generously	 in	the	education,	health	
and	social	well‐being	of	citizens,	far	from	being	a	drag	on	economic	vitality,	may	support	highly	
productive,	prosperous,	creative,	inclusive	and	safe	societies.	On	all	of	these	criteria,	the	Nordic	
countries	 not	 only	 compete	 with	 but	 also	 significantly	 outperform	 their	 market	 liberal	
counterparts	 in	 the	 Anglo	 world.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 idealise	 these	 societies	 or	 suggest	 they	 are	
without	 their	own	problems,	challenges	and	shortcomings,	 let	alone	hold	 them	up	as	a	model	
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that	can	be	imitated	elsewhere.	Rather,	the	fundamental	point	is	they	give	the	lie	to	neo‐liberal	
orthodoxy	that	there	is	no	alternative	but	to	embrace	free	markets	and	small	government	and	
accept	inevitable	trade‐offs	between	social	inclusivity	and	economic	success	(with	the	corollary	
that	 those	 for	whom	the	market	has	no	use	will	be	subject	 to	an	ever‐expanding	apparatus	of	
punitive	controls).		
	
They	show	there	are	proven	alternative	paths	to	a	 ‘sustaining	society’	(Currie	2012):	a	society	
that	 is	 (more)	 egalitarian,	 prosperous,	 innovative,	 tolerant	 and	 safe,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	
sparing	in	its	reliance	on	criminalisation	and	penal	repression	(Pratt	and	Eriksson	2013).	They	
should	 encourage	us	 not	 to	 imitate	 them	but	 to	 imagine	 alternative	 futures	 and	 draw	on	our	
own	political	traditions	to	build	them.		
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